A YEAR AGO an economic forecasting unit in the Chinese government published an outlook for the coming year. The big worry, it concluded, was the external environment. Shipments to America, China’s biggest customer, would suffer as the trade war dragged on. China had maxed out its exports to other big countries, and others were too small to make a difference.
So China’s boffins are, like many others, surprised by how things have gone. Exports to America are indeed down, by nearly 15% so far this year. But exports to the rest of the world have been much stronger (see chart). China, it turns out, had more to sell to its big customers: exports to Europe are on track to surpass exports to America this year. Meanwhile exports to smaller markets in South-East Asia, such as Vietnam and Malaysia, have boomed.
According to data from CPB World Trade Monitor, China’s share of global exports has reached 11.9%, slightly higher than in July 2018, when the first American tariffs hit. Sluggish imports—in part because of a domestic slowdown—mean the trade surplus is set to be about a quarter bigger in 2019 than in 2018.
One explanation for China’s resilient exports is the yuan’s 6% depreciation against the dollar since the trade war began. That has blunted the tariffs’ impact. China’s currency has also weakened against other major trading partners.
A second is goods routed through other countries to avoid tariffs. Some sent to South-East Asia have ended up in America. Vietnamese customs officials have stepped up checks of everything from seafood to aluminium to ensure that they are not relabelled Chinese goods. Julian Evans-Pritchard of Capital Economics, a research firm, estimates that American tariffs have cut Chinese GDP growth by about 0.6 percentage points, but that trans-shipments through South-East Asia may have lifted it back up by 0.3 percentage points.
There is also a third, more positive explanation: Chinese companies are highly competitive. Once an assembly centre, China now makes more of the inputs that go into final goods. Its efforts in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors are well-known. But it is making lower-tech progress more broadly. The Chinese light-industry council, representing toymakers, food firms and the like, estimates that its 100 most technologically advanced members invest 2.5% of revenues in research and development, high by international standards; it is pressing them to hit 3%.
The road ahead will not be easy for Chinese exporters. The longer American tariffs last, the more likely American buyers are to find alternatives. The fall in Chinese sales to America has accelerated recently.
On December 4th Chinese exporters of machinery and electronics met for their annual conference. The theme was “flourishing together along One Belt, One Road”, in line with the government’s policy of promoting economic ties with Asia, Africa and Europe. In previous years that might have been politically astute positioning. Now it looks like a survival strategy.
一年前中国政府的一个经济预测部门公布了对来年的展望,结论是,人们最担心的是外部环境。随着贸易战的持续,对中国最大客户美国的出口将受到影响。中国向其他经济大国的出口已经到了最大限度,而对其他经济体的出口规模太小,难以产生影响。
所以中国的研究人员和其他许多人一样,对事态的发展感到惊讶。今年到目前为止,对美国的出口确实下降了近15%。但对世界其他地区的出口要强劲得多(见图表)。事实证明,中国有更多的东西可以卖给它的大客户:今年对欧洲的出口有望超过对美国的出口。与此同时,对东南亚较小市场(如越南和马来西亚)的出口也蓬勃发展。
根据CPB世界贸易监测数据,中国在全球出口中所占份额已达到11.9%,略高于2018年7月美国首次征收关税时的水平。进口疲软——部分原因是国内经济放缓--------意味着中国2019年的贸易顺差将比2018年扩大四分之一左右。
对中国强劲出口的一种解释是,自贸易战开始以来,人民币对美元贬值了6%。这削弱了关税的影响。中国的货币对其他主要贸易伙伴的汇率也有所下降。
第二种解释是货物通过其他国家来规避关税。一些被发往东南亚的货物最终来到了美国。越南海关已经加强了对从海鲜到铝的所有商品的检查,以确保它们不是被换了标签的中国商品。研究公司凯投宏观(Capital Economics)的朱利安·埃文斯-普里查德(Julian Evans-Pritchard)估计,美国的关税已将中国的GDP增长率削减了约0.6个百分点,但通过东南亚的转运使中国的GDP增长率又回升了0.3个百分点。
还有第三种更为积极的解释:中国企业的竞争力很强。中国曾经是一个组装中心,现在生产最终产品所需的要素更多为国产。中国在半导体等高科技领域的努力是众所周知的。但他也在更广泛地推动低技术进步。代表玩具制造商、食品公司等的中国轻工业委员会估计,其100个技术最先进的成员将营业收入的2.5%投入到研发中,以国际标准衡量,这一比例很高;该委员会正敦促这些成员达到3%。
对中国出口商来说,前面的道路并不容易。美国关税持续的时间越长,美国买家就越有可能找到替代来源。最近中国对美国的出口下降速度加快了。
12月4日,中国机电产品出口商召开年会。主题是“一带一路”,符合政府加强与亚洲、非洲和欧洲经济联系的政策。在过去的几年里,这可能是敏锐的政治站队。现在看起来则更像是为生存而采取的策略。